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T
his issue of CentrePiece
celebrates the opening of
the LSE’s new Research
Laboratory. With a £6.5
million grant from the
Wellcome/OST/HEFCE
Joint Infrastructure Fund, the top two
floors of the School’s Lionel Robbins
Building have been redesigned by
Foster & Partners, so that all the LSE
research centres concerned with
economics and social policy are
brought together.
The result is the creation of by far the
most impressive single concentration
of economics research not only in the
UK but in the whole of Europe. The
constituents are the Suntory and
Toyota International Centres for
Economics and Related Disciplines
(STICERD), the Centre for Economic
Performance (CEP), the Financial
Markets Group (FMG) and the
Centre for the Analysis of Social
Exclusion (CASE). 
While still falling far short in terms of
numbers or funding of the leading
economics research centres at US
universities, like those at Harvard or
MIT, the new research laboratory
represents a unique national and
European resource. Well over 200
talented economists, including a high
proportion of the country’s leading
academics, scholars with international
reputations from the US, the
Continent and elsewhere, and post-
graduate researchers from more than
30 countries will now be working
together in easy proximity and
enjoying well-designed facilities. The
close working relationship between
younger researchers and senior staff
has created a kind of apprenticeship
environment that has produced high
quality recruits to the profession.
All the elements now housed in the
Research Laboratory share a
common philosophy. First, they are
rigorous academic research centres,
not think tanks. The research they do
appears in the form of working
papers, discussion papers and
articles in refereed journals, which
can be downloaded from their
respective web sites. In addition, of
course, there is a whole range of
conferences, public seminars and
lectures and more popular
dissemination through the media,
including CentrePiece itself.
Second, almost all the research is
based on rigorous data analysis,
using major longitudinal national and
international datasets, or surveys
carried out by the Centres
themselves. These substantial
datasets are held on a secure data
server in the Laboratory and include,
for example, a range of micro- and
macro-datasets from the UK Data
Archive, the OECD, the IMF and the
NBER in the United States. The result
is that the interface between the work
done in the individual Centres and the
“real world” of policy and executive
decisions is evidence-based analysis,
unbiased by presumptions or any
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of the new LSE
economics and
social policy
Research Centre.
Four into one
particular ideology. As a result, 
the collective impact on public policy
in the UK over the past decade,
under both New Labour and the
previous Conservative government,
has been extraordinary, far greater
than anything resulting from
economic research at Oxford,
Cambridge or the London Business
School, for example.
Some random examples of CEP
research may serve to support this
claim. Research on long-term
unemployment patterns in Europe
revealed the negative effects of long-
term unemployment benefits and the
positive effects of active help for the
unemployed and so provided the
intellectual basis for the whole of the
“welfare to work” and New Deal
programmes of the Blair government.
Research into workless families
inspired the Working Families Tax
Credit scheme. Research into the
impact of introducing a national
minimum wage predicted that, if set
at a reasonable level, it would have
little effect in reducing jobs and
significant positive welfare benefits.
Work on the links between skills,
especially numeracy, labour
productivity and low wages produced
evidence of the negative effects of
lower skills in the UK and the US in
comparison with northern Europe
and led to the National Skills Audit.
Similarly, FMG research has fed into
policy on capital adequacy
requirements, transparency in
securities dealing and the regulation
of market making in an increasingly
competitive environment. CASE
research with policy implications to
which the government has reacted
has included analysis of the effects of
childhood deprivation and the roots
of homelessness. 
The impact of this linked group of
research centres on public policy has
gone beyond the generation of
evidence and ideas. To an extent
without precedent in the British
academic world, senior staff have
been active members of a whole
range of public bodies. For example,
Richard Layard is a consultant to the
Department for Education and
Employment on welfare to work. No
fewer than four LSE academics have
been or are members of the Bank of
England Monetary Policy Committee
(Charles Goodhart, Stephen Nickell,
Sushil Wadhwani and Willem Buiter).
David Metcalf is a member of the
Low Pay Commission and
ombudsman for the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development.
Danny Quah is a consultant to the
Bank of England on monetary
analysis and a member of the
Treasury’s panel of economic
advisers. Charles Bean is now Chief
Economist at the Bank of England.
Tony Venables was last year director
of Trade Research at the World
Bank. Nick Stern, who originally
floated the idea of the Laboratory 10
years ago, is now Chief Economist at
the World Bank. Taken as a whole,
the investment by the ESRC and
other donors and the LSE itself over
the last ten years has produced a
remarkable return.
What of future prospects for the new
Research Laboratory? There is a
general and often justified suspicion
when claims are put forward for the
potential of synergy. However, in this
case there are powerful positive
forces at work. The first is critical
mass. This is the largest
concentration of this kind of talent
anywhere outside the US. The
second is the range of disciplines
involved. The various Centres bring
very different perspectives and
methods to common issues:
economics, finance and capital
markets, and social policy. 
There has already been some overlap
and cooperation between the
Centres in their past manifestations.
Housed together, they offer the real
potential for new and powerful inter-
disciplinary perspectives on critical
issues. A $1 million joint research
programme involving STICERD 
and FMG into the future of pensions
and funded by UBS has already 
been agreed.
The new joint location has several
things going for it. The IT and data
base and related support services,
already probably the best enjoyed by
any economics researchers in the
UK, is now shared and has been
greatly strengthened. But, above all,
there is the location itself. By the
Aldwych, directly linked by an elegant
high-level Bridge of Sighs to the
LSE’s economics department,
looking out over the Law Courts and
equidistant from Whitehall and the
City, it is an ideal and easy meeting
ground for academics, politicians,
senior civil servants, bankers and
businessmen, as well as providing
the leading UK forum for lectures and
seminars by visiting foreign stars,
especially from the US. 
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Turning 
the tide
Can trade unions in Britain reverse
20 years of membership decline? 
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By David Metcalf
David Metcalf examine the record and maps a way forward.
U
nion membership in Britain actually rose
by 100,000 in 1999. This ended two
decades of sustained membership
losses – the longest, deepest decline in
British labour history, involving a cumula-
tive fall of over 5 million members. By the
end of the century, 7.3 million employees
in Great Britain were union members,
equivalent to three employees in every 10. Is this recent rise
a mere blip in the unions’ continued march to dissolution, or
does it augur resurgence?
Membership data alone are a very blunt indicator of unions’
role in industrial relations. The number of workers covered
by collective bargaining also matters. The majority of
employees (13.6 million, or 57%) are neither union
members, nor covered by a collective agreement. Of those
8.5 million employees covered by an agreement, under two
thirds (5.4 million) are union members – implying that there
are some 3 million free riders, who get the benefits of
collective agreements but don’t belong to a union.
Looking at the evidence the other way round, nearly a
quarter of union members are not covered by a collective
agreement (1.6 million out of 7 million). These will include
people who retain their membership even though their
employer no longer recognises the union. They also include
many teachers and nurses, who are union members but
whose pay is set by arbitration by Review Bodies. In other
cases, the employer recognises a union for grievance and
discipline matters, but not for pay bargaining.
Going hand in hand with the decline in union penetration
has been a profound change in the type of mechanisms that
provide employees with a voice – a big switch away from
representative voice to direct voice. Representative voice
occurs via a recognised trade union or works council.
Direct voice bypasses these intermediate institutions.
Instead, management and employees communicate directly
with one another through, for example, team briefings,
regular meetings between senior management and the
workforce and problem solving groups, such as quality
circles. Between 1984 and 1998, the proportion of
workplaces with only representative voice arrangements
halved, while those relying just on a direct voice nearly
trebled. What happened was that unionised workplaces
added complementary direct communication systems, while
nearly all new workplaces opted for direct communication
methods without recognising unions.
There is no evidence that union activity – causing higher
labour costs, for example – results in a higher rate of
closures among unionised plants, compared with their non-
union counterparts. Between 1984 and 1998, closure
rates were virtually identical for both union and non-union
workplaces. Nor has management embarked on wholesale
derecognition of trade unions – the derecognition rate was
around 1% a year between 1984 and 1998. Although
derecognition in some national newspapers, TV and docks
generated bitter industrial disputes and considerable
media interest, it turns out that such management action
was quite rare.
Rather, the decline turns on the inability of unions to achieve
recognition in newly established workplaces, reflecting
Thatcherite views among some managers and the growth of
investment from overseas. By 1998 only a quarter of
workplaces under 10 years old recognised a trade union,
half the corresponding figure for older workplaces. This
inability to get much of a foothold in new workplaces is not,
as is often asserted, confined to private services. More
stunning is the virtual collapse of recognition in newer
manufacturing plants. Only 14% of manufacturing
workplaces set up after 1980 recognise a union, compared
with 50% of those established in 1980 or before.
Similarly, the likelihood of a young worker being a union
member has declined over time, both absolutely and
compared with older workers. This is partly explained
because they work in newer non-union workplaces. In
1998, only 10% of the workforce in workplaces established
prior to 1980 was aged under 25, whereas the correspon-
ding figure was 17% for those set up in the 1980s and
1990s.
While recognition in newer workplaces is vital to the long
run health of the union movement, we should not lose sight
of falling membership levels even where unions are recog-
nised. In 1980, 25% of all employees were in a closed
shop, but the legislative onslaught against trade unions in
the 1980s meant that by 1990 very few workplaces still had
one. If in the 1980s unions lost the support of the State and
of managers, in the 1990s they lost the support of many
employees, who showed a much reduced propensity to
belong to a union, even when encouraged to do so by
management.
Whether unions are facing dissolution or can recover will
mainly depend on what they do to companies and for
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Management has not embarked on wholesale
derecognition of trade unions.
employees. Consider the link between union recognition
and the financial performance of the workplace – the
“vested interest” impact of unions. Evidence from the 1998
Workplace Employment Relations Survey, covering over
1000 workplaces in the trading sector, shows the following:
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Figure 2 If there were no union, wage structure 
would be wider by %
Group 
Male/female 2.6
White/black 1.4
Healthy/health problems 0.6
Non-manual/manual 3.1
Figure 1 Probability of above average financial 
performance when union is recognised
whole sample –8.2%
1-5 competitors –12.4%
6+ competitors 7.4%
Even after controlling for all sorts of other factors that
influence profits – human resource practices, industry,
workplace size, etc the likelihood of above average 
financial performance is 8.2% lower in unionised than in
otherwise similar non-union workplaces. But this is far
from the whole story. This association is much stronger in
monopolistic sectors, defined as being situations 
where management recognise no more than five compet-
ing workplaces. By contrast, where there are many
competitors union recognition boosts the likelihood of
above average financial performance. Unions should
surely make more of this important positive link between
recognition and profits in competitive sectors.
The explanation seems to be that unions siphon off some
of the excess profits in monopolistic sectors – a transfer
from capital to labour. It may also be that management in
such sectors is worse – grown feeble and fat due to their
monopoly power – and that their preference for a quiet life
yields a handsome payoff for unions.
Unions also have a lot to offer employees – they 
wield a “sword of justice” in the labour market. It is
straightforward to calculate what the present wage 
structure is and what it would look like if there were 
no unions:
If there were no unions, the gender pay gap would be
2.6% wider and the race pay gap 1.4% bigger. These are
very substantial effects. They can be put in perspective by
a comparison with the impact of the national minimum
wage (NMW). Its introduction in 1999 had a specially
favourable effect on female pay – two thirds of 
those affected were women – and it narrowed the 
gender differential by a bit under 1%. Compare this 
with unions’ impact: unions compress the gender 
pay differential by 2.6% – almost treble the impact of 
the initial NMW.
Union recognition is associated with a much greater 
likelihood of the workplace having some form of equal
opportunity policy and an array of family friendly 
policies designed to encourage female employment.
Women in unionised workplaces are much better off 
in terms of career opportunities, flexible work arrange-
ments and general support for family responsibilities 
than their counterparts in non-union workplaces. 
Further, a union workplace is a fifth more likely to have 
an equal opportunities policy on gender than its 
non-union “twin”.
Unions also cut industrial accidents. An accident in this
context is where an employee has sustained any one of
eight injuries during working hours over the last 12 months,
including bone fractures, burns, amputations and any injury
that results in immediate hospitalisation for more than 24
hours. Unions tend to organise in workplaces where an
accident is more likely to occur, but their presence lowers
the rate by a quarter, compared with non-union plants.
How might unions reverse the decline and achieve a
sustained rise in their membership levels? Broadly, there
are two possible routes to revival. Either employment in
unionised sectors of the economy has to grow relative to
non-union employment, or unions must engage in more
intense organising activity.
Frankly, it is most unlikely that any boost in the aggregate
number of jobs in the labour market will occur dispropor-
tionately in the unionised sector. While there are plans for a
modest rise in the number of police, nurses and teachers,
the (highly unionised) public sector will not experience
much growth in the next decade. There is also no sugges-
tion of a strong growth in jobs in manufacturing, utilities or
transport. It is likely, instead, that the major share of any
growth in employment will occur in private services, which
at present have a union membership level of under 15%. So
disproportionate growth in employment in the union sector
is not the route to a restoration of unions’ fortunes.
Unions can organise individuals and/or companies. The
“sword of justice” effects – lower accident rates, more
egalitarian pay structures and promotion of family friendly
policies – could, in principle be used to appeal to the
current 3 million free riders.
Greater effort is probably required when the focus is put
on the 13.6 million employees (57% of the total) who are
neither covered by collective bargaining nor are union
members. The TUC Organising Academy is training a
cadre of 50 or so young organisers. Evaluation at the
Cardiff Business School suggests that the campiagns to
which they contribute generated some 18,000 new
members in the last two years. Such recruitment is but a
small fraction of the 500,000 new members required each
year, if – allowing for the normal churning in the labour
market – unions are even to maintain their present
membership levels. 
The 1999 British Social Attitudes survey indicates that 40%
of non-union employees in non-union workplaces would join
a union, if one was available – an untapped recruitment pool
of over 3 million employees who come under the
Employment Relations Act, which came into force last year
to facilitate union recognition. Such recognition occurs
voluntarily, or via the law. Voluntary recognition stems either
from true love (cooperation between capital and labour), or
a marriage of convenience (a pragmatic second best). The
legal route, inevitably associated with adversarial industrial
relations, is a shotgun marriage, imposed on a resistant
employer by an arm of the State.
Under the legal route, if a union can prove a majority of
membership in the bargaining unit, then it gains recogni-
tion. If not, a ballot is held in which the union must win 
50% + of the votes cast in the ballot and must have at least
40% of the workforce in the bargaining unit voting “yes”. 
It is too early to assess the impact of this legislation, but 
it is unlikely – by itself – to lead to a resurgence of 
membership via a flood of new recognition agreements.
This is because:
n by simple arithmetic, even if there were to be an election
every day involving 500 employees with the unions
wining half, this would yield only 50,000 extra employees
in newly recognised bargaining units each year;
n the USA has had a similar law for more than half a
century, yet less than one worker in 10 in the private
sector is a union member;
n statutory recognition procedures in the 1970s only
added, directly, 60,000 members to union ranks;
n triggering the law means that the employer is hostile to
recognition and consultancy firms are already fuelling
such opposition. (One recently went so far as to assert
that “UK employers should view a union organisational
effort as an economic heart attack”.)
Voluntary recognition is an alternative to use of the law.
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Women in unionised workplaces are much
better off in terms of 
career opportunities.
Some recent genuine partnership agreements – love
matches – include those between GB Airways and the
AEEU, covering 400 cabin crew, engineers and ground
staff, and others at the Inland Revenue, Unisys and Tesco.
Such agreements aim to switch the focus of relations
between labour and capital away from battling over the size
of the slices towards achieving a bigger cake.
Pragmatic recognition – marriages of convenience – may
well also suit both parties in certain situations. The
employer might, for example, achieve provisions on dispute
resolution that would not be available if the union relation-
ship was adversarial. And, from the union viewpoint,
recognition imposed on a combative employer might prove
a Pyrrhic victory, because with it comes no explicit duty on
an employer to bargain in good faith thereafter.
Nearly 800 voluntary agreements – partnerships or
marriages of convenience – were signed between 1995
and 2000, bringing some 500,000 new workers under
recognition. But the union focus was still on the traditional
areas – half these new agreements were in public services
or the ex-public sector field, like NHS caterers. A further
50,000 of these new members were in the familiar
manufacturing, finance, and transport and communication
sectors, leaving just one in six of the newly covered
workers in the rest of the private sector.
Unions will hope that this indirect effect of the new recog-
nition law remains strong, promoting an even greater flow
of “voluntary” recognitions than in recent years. Although
signing up with sufficient employers is vital, unions must
also pay greater attention to declining membership levels
even where they remain recognised. If unions could retain
their existing members and sign up 10% of the 3 million
free riders each year their fortunes would be transformed.
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David Metcalf is Director of the Leverhulme Trust Programme on
the Future of Trade Unions in Modern Britain at the CEP and
Professor of Industrial Relations at the LSE.
More details of the arguments and evidence in this article are
contained in CEP Discussion Paper 493 April 2001, available on
request by e-mail to l.f.cleavely@lse.ac.uk
There is no suggestion of strong growth in
jobs in manufacturing, utilities or transport.
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B
ritain now has its lowest unemployment rate
for 20 years. The employment-to-population
rate, even after adjusting for population
growth, is only just below the 75% highs
experienced in the previous cyclical peaks in
1979 and 1999. Despite this, inflation has
been lower than for any sustained period since the 1960s.
However, this good news masks mounting evidence that
high levels of worklessness are increasingly concentrated
on certain categories of individuals and households, on
specific socio-economic groups, and in particular
geographic areas. Focusing just on the aggregate
unemployment rate overlooks these problems, which have
been growing over the past 20 years. In the same way,
focusing on the growth in average wages overlooks the
development of wage inequalities that we have not seen in
a hundred years. 
Taken together, these developments have created the most
pressing labour market and social problems now facing the
government. The concentration of unemployment on certain
individuals and areas has its impact on job opportunities
and life chances and the rise in the number of households
with no working adult leads to rising child poverty. The
policy objective of bringing down the unemployment rate
overlooks the unprecedented rate at which people have
simply dropped out of the labour market entirely. This is
true, in particular, for older and less qualified men.
According to the latest Labour Force Survey (LFS), there
are now 2.3 million men of working age (not counting
students) who are “economically inactive”. This figure is
Steadily falling national jobless figures hide a 20-year rise in the number
of workless families, in the length of time spent by individuals out of
work and in the number of older men dropping out of employment
entirely. Richard Dickens, Paul Gregg and Jonathan Wadsworth analyse
an urgent problem for the new government’s economic policy. 
By Richard Dickens, Paul Gregg and Jonathan Wadsworth
Non-working
classes
Britain’s new chronic unemployed
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twice that for the registered male unemployed and 20 years
ago was only 400,000. Finally, the extent and persistence of
low wages and their relationship to job loss is creating a
spreading “no-pay-low-pay” syndrome.
The government, like the Bank of England, thinks that we
are close to, perhaps even below, the level of unemploy-
ment where inflation picks up. So it is trying to reduce infla-
tionary pressure by reducing the concentration of
worklessness on certain individuals, groups and communi-
ties by various New Deal policies, designed to reduce
“mismatch” and to increase the effectiveness of job search
for the unemployed. The dominant theory suggests that the
more unemployment is concentrated on specific groups the
less efficient it is in restraining wage pressures in the
economy as a whole. 
The implication is that the level of unemployment at which
inflation starts to rise is higher than when unemployment is
more evenly spread. However, employment mismatch, as
measured by area or skill, seems to have contributed little
to the rise in unemployment since the 1960s. Greater
unemployment differences between regions and, to a lesser
extent, skill groups did emerge in the late 1980s, but since
then unemployment differentials have returned to something
like their historical norms. Table 1 outlines the major varia-
tions in unemployment rates observed in 1998. The great-
est variation was by ethnic origin, with one third of
Bangladeshi and Pakistani men unemployed.
Unemployment rates were also relatively high among the
young, the less educated and men in general.
Workers move between employment and unemployment
relatively infrequently, but even over longer time intervals the
bulk of unemployment falls on a minority of individuals. An
example drawn from the JUVOS data of administrative
unemployment claims serves to clarify this. On a represen-
tative day in 1995, 1,270,000 males aged between 22 and
59 were registered as claimant unemployed (approximately
9% of the workforce). During the whole of 1995 approxi-
mately twice this number experienced a spell of unemploy-
ment. But just 650,000 (26%) of those ever unemployed in
the year accounted for half the total number of days in
unemployment. This concentration of unemployment on
certain individuals is not very sensitive to the cycle (see
Figure 1). 
Unemployment is even more concentrated over longer
periods of time. Taking a three year period, the number
experiencing any unemployment rises to three times that
observed on a typical day, but the concentration intensifies,
so that only 760,000 men (19% of all those unemployed)
accounted for half of all days of unemployment. Evidence
from the National Child Development Survey suggests that
Figure 1 JUVOS longitudinal cohort for males aged 22 to 59. JUVOS is a data base of claimant unemployed records for
a 5% sample of the population. Those with fewer than five days unemployment are excluded.
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Table 1 ILO unemployment rates for selected 
groups in spring 1998
All Men Women
Age 16-24 12.4 14.0 10.4
Age 25-49 5.2 5.6 4.8
Age 50+ 4.9 5.8 3.5
Degree 3.0 3.0 2.9
Higher 4.2 4.5 3.8
Lower 7.1 8.3 5.9
None 12.2 15.6 8.4
White 5.7 6.3 4.9
Black 14.6 15.4 13.7
Indian 9.1 9.1 9.0
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 20.4 19.7 22.3
Other 12.7 14.8 10.1
There are now 2.3 million
men of working age who are
economically inactive.
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those with more than one year of unemployment by the age
of 23 subsequently experience their fifth period of
unemployment between the ages of 24 and 33. By contrast,
those who experienced no unemployment by the age of 23
spent under 2% of their time up to age 33 unemployed.
This concentration of unemployment is explained in part by
the fact that the probability of getting out of unemployment
falls the longer you are unemployed. For most people
unemployment is brief, but for the minority who do not leave
quickly unemployment becomes prolonged. Inflows into
unemployment are now only a fraction above those in the
late 1960s, but the duration of unemployment spells is more
than double. This decline in exit rates from unemployment
appears to be common to most countries, except Sweden.
However, the UK has the steepest deterioration in exit rates
in Europe. Britain is recording relatively low unemployment
rates because of a high overall exit rate, but the deteriora-
tion in the chances of leaving unemployment as the
unemployment spell lengthens remains one of the steepest
in Europe. 
The other important factor leading to heavy concentration is
the incidence of repeated unemployment. Those entering
unemployment often have a history of past unemployment.
Figure 2 shows that of all men starting a spell of unemploy-
ment in 1997 half had been unemployed within the previous
six months. This repeat incidence has been rising since
1991 and is most common among prime-age men, where
unemployment rates are generally low.
Turning next to the geography of joblessness in the UK, it
seems that regional unemployment differentials are lower
now than they have been for many years. However, broad
regional aggregates do not capture the real patterns of
geographical divergence in unemployment. There is, and
always has been, much greater variation in unemployment
within regions than between them. In some regions you get
near full employment alongside areas of severe deprivation1
The proportion of working-age men not in work varies from
13% to 26% across the ten standard regions. At county
level this spread nearly doubles from 8% to 31%. At finer
levels of disaggregation this dispersion is greater still,
highlighting the plight of many coastal towns and the former
coal mining districts alongside major urban areas. Again,
Inner London and other major cities have unemployment
rates around twice those of the surrounding counties.
However, by far the worst geographical concentrations of
joblessness are in our social housing estates. Here
unemployment rates of 25% and above are commonplace.
These concentrations are undoubtedly not helped by the
shrinkage of the social housing sector. The resulting selec-
tion of who is housed in these estates and the intensity of
deprivation is astounding. 
The second major trend in the labour market is the rise in
the level of economic inactivity. In analysing this phenome-
non, the incorporation of the lLO/OECD search-based
measure of unemployment into the government’s basket of
Figure 2 Time since last unemployment spell, males
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Note: JUVOS longitudinal cohort; males aged 22 to 59
Start year of spell
Less than 6 months
6-12 months
1-2 years
More than 2 years
1 For example in October 1990, when the average claimant count
unemployment rate for the North-West region was 4.6%, the rate for
Macclesfield was 1.6% and for Knowsley 11.7%.
men may be discouraged from job searching by the low
entry wages on offer. 
So any policy aimed at dealing with inactivity has to begin
by addressing the question why male inactivity has risen
most among older, less skilled workers in depressed labour-
market areas. If declining workforce participation is largely
a voluntary supply-driven issue, we should expect to see
higher withdrawal rates among groups with alternative
incomes (savings, pensions, etc). This has not happened.
The prime reason given for their inactivity by men under 60
is sickness, rather than retirement. All this suggests that a
high level of labour demand is a necessary condition for the
reduction of inactivity, but the inability of the current
upswing to make a significant dent in inactivity rates
suggests that it is not a sufficient condition.
This rise in economic activity rates has gone hand in hand
with an unprecedent rise in income and wage inequality.
This increase followed a period of declining dispersion in
the 1970s. Wage inequality has continued to rise through
the 1990s, though the scale of the increase has been
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labour market indicators is a welcome improvement. The
search-based measure of joblessness makes it relatively
easy to analyse whether the unemployment figures
adequately capture the true extent of labour market slack
and of the social distress caused by lack of work. Over the
last 20 years, policy based solely around the unemployment
rate has overlooked the sharp decline we can now measure
in male labour force participation.
Why this has come about is not entirely clear, but we can
say with confidence that economic inactivity among men is
highly correlated with labour market conditions, being
concentrated among older, less skilled men and among
those living in local authority housing. Inactivity is also great-
est in areas with the highest unemployment and the lowest
employment rates. Male inactivity has risen among all age
groups (see Table 2). In absolute terms, the most dramatic
increase has been among the over-50s. Some 28% of men
over 50 years old (1.3 million) are now economically
inactive, compared with less than 7% in 1975. However, it
is important to recognise that this problem is not confined
to older workers. Around 8% of non-student men under 50
(1 million) are now inactive, compared with fewer than 1%
in 1975. Perhaps the most striking incidence of inactivity is
among men resident in social housing; of these, 30% are
inactive and only 54% in work.
Economic participation rates are also highly correlated with
educational attainment. The lower the level of qualifications
held, the more likely it is that an individual will be economi-
cally inactive. More than 25% of men with no or few formal
qualifications are now inactive, three times more than the
rate for graduates (8%). 
Table 2 also shows that, in the latest recovery, activity rates
have continued to fall, whereas in the 1980s upturn they
were broadly flat. So for similar employment increases (just
over 2% per year), there has been a much larger fall in
unemployment in the 1990s. 
Table 3 shows how inactivity is negatively correlated with
local labour-market conditions. For counties with the lowest
employment rate (less than 70%), over one in four less
skilled men are inactive. Conversely, for those with employ-
ment rates over 78%, male inactivity is half as much. In the
latest six years of the present extended recovery, those
counties with the lowest employment gains have the worst
records for the change in economic activity rates. Again this
effect is strongest for less skilled men. However, even in the
best-performing areas, male inactivity rates for less skilled
men have not fallen much, although female inactivity rates in
these areas have indeed fallen markedly. The inability of the
recovery to halt the decline in male participation suggests
that aggregate labour demand is only a partial explanation
of this development. It may be that less skilled men are
perceived as being at the very end of the queue of potential
labour and so are ignored by employers until the local
labour market is very tight indeed. Alternatively, low skilled
Table 2 Male employment, inactivity, and unemployment 
by education, housing tenure and age
Employment/ Labour-force/ Unemployment/
population population population
Men % % %
1984 80.9 91.4 11.5
1990 84.6 91.2 7.2
1993 77.6 88.7 12.5
1999 81.2 87.0 6.6
Men with low qualifications
1984 73.9 87.3 15.3
1990 79.3 88.3 10.2
1993 70.8 85.4 17.2
1999 73.6 81.7 9.9
Men in council house accommodation
1984 63.5 84.8 25.1
1990 66.5 82.2 19.2
1993 52.5 77.8 32.5
1999 53.7 69 9 23.1
Men aged 50-64
1984 70.1 76.9 8.9
1990 70.0 75.9 7.8
1993 63.8 72.5 12.0
1999 68.3 72.4 5.7
Note: Table excludes students. Participants on active labour-market 
programmes are classified as employed.
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somewhat tempered. The marked deterioration in the
position of the low paid (bottom decile) relative to the
median in Britain is in contrast to most other industrialised
countries. (A notable exception here is the US.) Some of
this increase in wage dispersion has occurred between
different education groups. The return to educational quali-
fications fell in the 1970s, but increased sharply in the
1980s for both males and females. The increase in the
return continued into the 1990s for males, but for females
the return to education fell slightly. The large increase in the
return to education in the 1980s occurred despite an
Figure 3 Entry and exit wages
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Note: Annual earnings from the Lifetime Labour Market Database. Average exit wage percentile is
defined as the average percentile in the annual pay distribution in the year t for those that experience
unemployment in year t+1. Average entry wage percentile is defined as the average percentile in the
annual pay distribution in year t for those that experienced unemployment in year t–1.
Start year of spell
Average exit wage percentile
Average entry wage percentile
Table 3 County emplyment patterns and inactivity of less-skilled workers, 1999
Area Inactivity rate, Inactivity rate, Inactivity rate, less-
employment rate less-skilled women less-skilled men skilled men (age 45+)
< 70 % 39.4 28.0 40.7
70-74 % 35.2 23.3 32.4
74-78 % 31.2 18.0 24.9
> 78 % 26.9 14.8 20.0
4-year rise in 4-year change in 4-year change in 4-year change in inactivity 
area employmentinactivity rate, inactivity rate, rate,less-skilled men 
rate less-skilled women less-skilledmen (age 45+)
< 2 points –3.5 1.1 1.7
2-3 points –5.1 –1.1 –1.0
3-4 points –5.1 –0.6 –0.2
> 4 points –6.8 –1 9 –1.1
Source: LFS.
By far the worst concentrations
of joblessness are in our 
social housing estates.
hour. Unemployment also affects future earnings. Figure 3
(previous page) shows the typical points in the (annual)
earnings distribution for men both leaving and entering
employment. Men who lose jobs are more likely to be low
paid, with the average “exit wage” (in 1995) close to the
37th percentile. In addition, the average “exit” percentile
has risen slightly since the late 1970s. The “entry wage”
into employment is lower still, with the average at about the
27th percentile in 1995. Moreover, this entry percentile has
fallen sharply since the late 1970s. In fact, weekly entry
wages after a spell out of work have barely risen in real
terms over the last 20 years. Since the entry wage gap has
increased over a long time, it is not being driven by the
cyclical behaviour of the economy, nor by stricter treatment
of the claimant unemployed. It is more likely that the expla-
nations are linked to the same factors underlying growing
wage inequality.
This suggests that the cost of job loss may have increased.
Research has found that the wage penalty after a spell of
unemployment increased by about 70% between the early
1980s and the 1990s. This earnings loss is larger for older
workers and the more highly skilled. Figure 4 shows that
the (annual) wage decline an individual faces after job loss
has grown from 7% to 17% over the last 20 years. For
workers over the age of 45, the wage fall has increased
from around 12% to 26%.
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increase in the supply of more highly educated workers.
This suggests that demand for more skilled workers was
rising faster than the supply. 
The sharp increase in cross-sectional wage inequality
clearly has serious welfare implications. The degree to
which this translates into inequality in lifetime earnings will
depend on the extent of earnings mobility in Britain. This
does not seem to be high. For example, over 48% of males
in the bottom decile of the hourly earnings distribution in
1993 were still there in 1994. Many of these low-paid
workers drop out of employment, so that only 20% actually
move up the distribution scale. Most of those that do
progress tend not to move very far, with two thirds of these
moving into the next decile, but virtually nobody moving
beyond the median. Mobility is somewhat greater when
earnings are observed over a longer time period. For
example, only 22% of males in the bottom decile in 1989
were still there in 1994. However, again, many have
dropped out of employment so that only 30% have actually
moved into a higher decile over this five-year period.
It is also evident that those stuck on low pay are also much
more likely to leave employment than those on higher pay.
Research has shown that employees paid below £3.50 an
hour (in April 1997 prices) were three times more likely to
be out of work a year later than those paid above £3.50 an
Figure 4 The cost of jobs loss for the over 45s
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Note: Annual earnings from the Lifetime Labour Markets Database. Job loss is defined as the
percentage difference in the average wage between t+1 and t–1 for those that experience
unemployment in year t and those that stay continuously in employment in year t.
Year
Average wage loss
Average wage loss, over 45s (%)
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The next crucial step is to link individual employment and
earnings patterns to household poverty and inequality,
particularly in relation to children. Worklessness has tradi-
tionally been studied in terms of the individual, while poverty
and income inequality are conventionally measured at the
household level. Only recently has the employment status of
the household been highlighted as an important area for
investigation. 
Over the last 30 years, the rise in the number of workless
households has been striking, especially for households
containing children. Table 4 shows that 17% were workless
in spring 1999 (just over one in six). These households
contained 4 million adults and 2.6 million children (13% and
8%per cent of the respective populations). These propor-
tions are roughly three times those found in the 1970s and
four times those of the late 1960s. Not surprisingly, these
workless households are generally also poor. In 1996,
some 70% of workless households were poor (i.e. had less
than half the mean income), rising to 90% in households
with children present. In many cases, worklessness is not a
temporary state. In 60% of workless households, no
resident adult had worked in the previous three years. 
This extended worklessness is also evident in households
with children. As with economic inactivity, a disconcerting
feature is that 48% of households with working-age
members in social housing were workless in 1999,
compared with 8% of households in owner-occupied
accommodation.
The rise in the proportion of workless households can be
analysed in terms of the contributions from changes in
aggregate employment, in family structure and in the distri-
bution of the available work across households. To do this
we take a prediction of whether a household is workless,
based on a random distribution of work among adults and
compare this with the actual patterns observed. So, if (as in
1999) 24% of working-age people (excluding students)
were out of work and if this joblessness was evenly distrib-
uted across households, then we would expect to observe
24% of single-adult households and 6% of two-adult
Table 4 Workless households
Workless households Households where Working age adults in Children in workless Employment
(working age) all adults work workless households households rate
FES 000s % 000s % 000s % 000s %
1968 540 4.0 7,150 52.8 800 2.6 520 4.0 76.3
1975 870 6.2 7,800 55.5 1,330 4.4 990 7.2 77.7
1981 1,530 10.6 7,800 55.4 2,540 8.1 1,730 13.2 73.1
1985 2,370 15.7 8,030 53.6 3,730 11.6 2,090 16.9 70.8
1990 2,180 13.3 10,340 63.1 3,200 9.6 1,890 15.6 76.7
1995 2,870 16.7 10,470 61.2 4,110 12.6 2,400 18.3 75.1
1996 2,990 17.4 10,570 61.5 4,330 13.2 2,560 19.6 75.7
LFS 000s % 000s % 000s % 000s %
1975 900 6.5 7,880 56.7 1,230 4.3 – – 76.8
1981 1,570 10.9 7,480 52.1 2,360 7.8 – – 72.9
1985 2,470 16.1 8,100 52.8 3,690 11.7 – – 71.6
1990 2,280 14.1 9,840 60.7 3,140 9.8 2,280 14.5 76.9
1995 3,300 19.1 10,420 60.4 4,480 14.1 2,880 20.4 73.9
1999 3,080 17.4 11,320 64.0 4,130 12.7 2,620 18.4 76.4
The sharp increase in wage
inequalities clearly has 
serious welfare implications. 
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Table 5 Decomposition of the Workless Household Rate in Britain between 1977 and 1999 (LFS)
Workless household Predicted rate Predictedholding Predictedholding Polarization
rate (1) (2) employment rate familystructure (1) – (2)
as in 1977 as in 1977
1977 8.2 8.5 8.5 8.5 –0.3
1990 14.1 9.0 9.2 8.3 5.1
1999 17.4 11.1 11.2 8.5 6.3
Change in the Change in the Change due to Change due to Change in
worklesshousehold rate predicted rate (A) family structure (B) employment (C) polarization
1977-99 9.2 2.6 2.6 0.1 6.6
1977-90 5.9 0.5 0.7 –0.2 5.4
1990-99 3.3 2.1 1.8 0.3 1.2
Note: ‘Predicted’ is based on a household's probability of being workless 
if work were randomly distributed across the working-age population.
households to be without work. The extent to which the
actual rate deviates from the predicted rate can be taken as
a measure of polarisation of work across households.
In 1977 the predicted rates almost exactly matched the
actual rates, implying no substantial polarisation of work.
The overall workless household rate has risen by 9 percent-
age points since then, but the employment rate has not
declined over this period and, therefore, has not
UK
Ireland
Australia
Canada
Finland
US
Belgium
Spain
Netherlands
France
Italy
Austria
Germany
Greece
Luxembourg
Portugal
Switzerland
Workless household rate %
0 5 10 15 20
Figure 5 Workless household rate across countries for
households with children (OECD, 1996)
contributed to the change. The move towards more single-
adult households explains about one third of the total rise
since the 1970s (Table 5), but the majority of the explana-
tion lies with how work is shared out across households.
The trends in the distribution of work by gender, age, and
skill group account for about a third of the observed polari-
sation. The rest follows from the fact
that female employment has
generally risen only in
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households where a partner is already in work, while men
are more likely to have dropped out of work, if they are
single or their partner does not work.
When comparing the distribution of work across house-
holds in Britain with other countries, two things stand out.
Polarization of work across households was greater in UK
than in all other developed countries studied in 1996. In
other words, the UK has substantially more workless
households with children than any other developed nation
(see Figure 5). 
With nearly one child in five growing up in a workless
household, 90% of which are poor, it is not surprising that
child poverty is high and has risen so fast in Britain. Around
one child in three now lives in a relatively poor household
and, as a result, child poverty is much higher than in other
European Union countries. Over the last 10 years, children
have replaced pensioners as the group with the highest
incidence of poverty in the UK. The case for policy inter-
vention is made more pressing by recent literature, which
suggests that childhood deprivation reduces educational
attainment and future earnings and increases the risk of
youth unemployment and early pregnancy.
In facing the problems outlined in this article, the govern-
ment has produced a stream of welcome policy initiatives.
These have included New Deal programmes for youth
education and training, for adults, for lone parents, and for
the sick and disabled; the National Minimum Wage; the
Working Family Tax Credit; the Child Care Tax Credit; and
a commitment to eliminate child poverty over 20 years.
However, the limitation of this range of policy responses is
also clear. The scale of the intervention so far has been
modest, particularly in the field of unemployment itself. The
total level of spending on New Deal projects is not high,
relative even to the programmes of previous Conservative
governments. Many of the initiative taken have been in the
form of pilot studies and short, low-cost schemes produc-
ing only marginal benefits. 
The scale of the interventions will need to be
substantially greater, if they are to make a
significant impact on the inequalities here
described. A Labour government in its
second term will need to increase the
scale of its intervention, if it is to begin to
ease the problems that 20 years of
indifference or wilful neglect have
engendered.
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The UK has substantially more
workless households with children
than any other developed nation.
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rotection of intellectual property rights in 
developing countries is becoming an increas-
ingly live issue. While the economic effects of
such protection are still not clearly understood,
these countries are pressing ahead 
with legislation as they seek to implement 
the GATT’s 1994 Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Agreement (TRIPs). 
The central issue is clear. Companies (mostly from the
developed countries) that rely heavily on intellectual
property protection resent the flagrant copying of their
products and the resulting loss in profit. Developing
countries resent the transfer of profits to foreign companies
and the large loss of consumer welfare resulting from
higher prices. So, how should developing countries design
and legislate for their future intellectual property systems?
Existing economic research highlights the tensions between
the static and the dynamic effects of intellectual property
protection in developing countries. Its conclusion is that
stronger intellectual property protection does not always
enhance welfare, even in developed countries. Nor does
empirical evidence reveal any very close link between the
enforcement of strong intellectual property laws and overall
innovative activity. It indicates that, at least in the short term,
the negative welfare effects of the TRIPs Agreement in
developing countries is not all that damaging. In the longer
term, welfare benefits, especially via enhanced domestic
innovative activity, are a real possibility, even under a
relatively weak implementation of TRIPs. However, domes-
tic innovation in developing countries is affected by much
else besides intellectual property law.
Two main themes emerge from this literature. The first is
that strengthening intellectual property protection is not
necessarily good for developing countries, for developed
countries, or even for the companies relying on it. A blind
push towards stronger intellectual property laws ignores
social welfare considerations and the subtle economic
tensions that are inherent in the process of intellectual
property protection. Even on the economic level, the situa-
tion is not clear. The incentive to innovate provided by intel-
lectual property protection must be balanced against the
interests both of consumers, who will be paying extra for
protected products, and of innovators, who will make future
TRIPping through the
Third World
Against the background of recent publicity about drug companies’ legal
battles in South Africa, Louise Keely looks at the pros and cons of the
laws that developing countries are required to enact to regulate
intellectual property.
Who gains from intellectual property protection?
R&D investment decisions on the
basis of expected return, which
may be decreased by increased
protection for previous innovations. 
The second theme is that the TRIPs
Agreement is not unequivocally
bad news for the developing
countries. It allows substantial
room for them to design and imple-
ment their own systems of protec-
tion. The transition from being just
technology importers to also being
technology producers will take time
and the economic impact of the agreement on developing
countries is not yet clear. So variations in the legislation
being introduced by developing countries will help in figur-
ing out which regimes seem to work best for all concerned.
On the other hand, as we have seen in the European Union,
variations between countries in intellectual property regimes
can, of themselves, create problems. 
The basic objective of intellectual property protection,
according to the TRIPs Agreement, is the dissemination of
knowledge. This is enshrined in its Article 7:
Intellectual property rights should contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the
mutual advantage of producers and users of techno-
logical knowledge and in a manner conducive to
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of
rights and obligations.
All intellectual property protection that is implemented in
signatory countries as a result should be consistent with the
spirit of this Article 7.
The Agreement is to be interpreted as a set of minimum
standards. Countries are allowed to introduce intellectual
property protection beyond that stipu-
lated by the Agreement (Article 1:1).
This setting of a lower bound is, there-
fore, likely to work as a force in the
direction of a harmonisation of intellec-
tual property laws. It remains to be seen
whether such harmonisation increases
welfare.
Part I of the Agreement (which contains
Article 7) sets out general provisions for
intellectual property protection.
Signatories are allowed some scope
to tailor their intellectual property
laws to their own economic and
legal needs (Article 1:1, 8:1,2).
However, there are requirements
that other nations’ individuals and
companies must be treated on a par
with their domestic counterparts
(Article 3) and the usual “most-
favored-nation” principles treatment
must be followed (Article 4).
Part II of the agreement sets out the
required legislation for protecting intellectual property, includ-
ing Copyrights, Trademarks, Geographical Indications,
Industrial Designs, Patents, Layout-Designs of Integrated
Circuits and Undisclosed Information (Trade Secrets). In
general, these provisions are to be consistent with past multi-
lateral agreements, such as the Paris and Berne
Conventions. An additional section of Part II is devoted to
describing conditions under which anti-competitive licensing
practices, designed to prevent the dissemination of technol-
ogy, may be restricted (Article 40).
One of the important elements of the TRIPs Agreement,
distinguishing it from other multilateral intellectual property
agreements, is the inclusion of enforcement requirements
(Part III) and an explicit disputes procedure (Part V). These
give the agreement its teeth, for countries are required not
only to pass intellectual property laws covering the area
summarised, but also to enforce them. If countries are
perceived not to be enforcing laws in line with the TRIPs
Agreement, then the dispute settlement mechanism of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) can be triggered. The
enforcement procedures are set out in significant detail in
order to ensure that laws implemented under the TRIPs
Agreement are effective.
It should be noted that there are special transitional arrange-
ments for developing and least-devel-
oped countries. Developing countries
are given an extra four years (Article 64)
and least-developed countries an extra
10 years (Article 65). Both groups of
countries have the right to ask for
technical and financial assistance from
developed countries (Article 66).
Comprehensive as the agreement aims
to be, there are areas of intellectual
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A blind push towards stronger
intellectual property laws ignores
social welfare considerations.
The TRIPS Agreement was signed in 1994
was a result of the Uruguay Round of
multilateral negotiations of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
It requires all signatory countries to bring in 
a level of intellectual property protection
comparable with that of most North American
and European Union countries. It allows 
for the enforcement of its terms via the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).
property policy on which it says nothing explicit. These are
areas where further negotiations and disputes are likely to
occur. They are also areas where developing countries can
make choices about what type of intellectual property laws
to pass and how to enforce them.
The elements where there is still substantial room for
choice can be divided into three broad categories. The first
concerns established forms of intellectual property that are
only partly described by the TRIPs Agreement. The second
is areas of still evolving intellectual property law, only partly
laid out by the TRIPs Agreement. The third is laws that fall
outside the confines of intellectual property law, but impact
upon it.
For example, several elements of patent design are not
covered by in the TRIPs Agreement. (Some of these
elements also apply to the other areas of intellectual
property protection.) Perhaps the most frequently raised is
the breadth of the patent. Economists define breadth in this
context in terms of the least similar invention that could still
be considered an infringement of the patent. Comparisons
of this breadth between countries or over time can be
made using, for example, the volume of litigation involved,
or the number of claims per patent granted. A similar
element is the “height” of a patent, a notion describing the
degree of novelty required by a new invention. These
concepts are not discussed in the TRIPs Agreement.
The agreement is also silent on the timing of disclosure of
a protected invention. In Europe, disclosure takes place 18
months after an application is filed, while in the United
States disclosure occurs when the application is granted.
Europe and the United States also differ in their policies on
who is granted a patent where more than one application
is filed. In Europe, the patent goes to the first one to file. In
the United States, a “first to invent” rule applies. Finally,
European patent systems include a renewal system, under
which patent holders regularly pay increasing fees in order
to maintain a patent, while no such system existed in the
United States until 1982.
In enforcing intellectual property laws,
each country has its own judicial
system, legal traditions and prece-
dents. Enforcement also relies on the
private sector to bring cases, since
the judicial system does not actively
seek out infringements. This inevitably
means that there will continue to be
national differences in intellectual
property protection regimes and the effectiveness with
which they are imposed.
It is also possible under the agreement to claim exemption
from intellectual property protection in several areas: by
appealing to fair use or public interest (Articles 13, 17, 24,
27:2, 27:3, 30, and 37); by fulfillment of conditions for
compulsory licensing of patents (Article 31); and by
exhaustion (Article 6). The exemptions for each type of
intellectual property protection are qualified by the interests
of the right holder and, in the case of patents, allowed only
for certain narrow purposes such as “to protect public
order or morality” (Article 27:2). For example, compulsory
licensing of trademarks is explicitly disallowed (Article 21). 
The issue of exhaustion of intellectual property protection
(where, for example, a drug is imported by a firm other than
the patent owner) is explicitly excluded from disputes
procedures under the TRIPs Agreement (Article 6). This
exclusion opens up the possibility that rightholders’ profits
could be diminished by competition through parallel impor-
tation. The strength of Article 6 is diminished by Article 28,
which explicitly protects patent holders against the impor-
tation of a violating product. However, Article 28 makes
this article subject to Article 6.
The second area of ambiguity in the TRIPs Agreement is
that of protection for certain technologies. There are four
clear types of technologies that do not fit immediately into
any of the existing intellectual property formats: protection
for biological products and processes such as plant
varieties; software; databases; and traditional knowledge.
The debate about the best way of protecting these
technologies is going on in both developed and developing
countries. Protection for commercial innovations involving
biological products and processes is a contentious issue,
for it raises not only questions of reward for invention but
also of ethics and biodiversity. The TRIPs Agreement
allows plants and animals to be excluded from patentabil-
ity. However, plant varieties must be protected by either a
patent, or a sui generis system, or
some combination of the two. Review
of this paragraph (Article 27:3b) is to
begin four years after the agreement
comes into force.
Computer programs are explicitly
covered under copyright protection in
the TRIPs Agreement (Article 10).
However, debate and litigation as to
whether computer programs are
CentrePiece Spring 2001 23
Drink© There are areas of policy on which
the agreement says nothing explicit.
developing countries of the TRIPs Agreement may, in
summary, include:
n deadweight loss from the introduction of monopoly
power
n transfer of profits from domestic consumers to foreign
firms
n displacement of domestic firms that rely on imitation
n administration costs of applying intellectual property
laws.
The possible pros of the TRIPs Agreement include:
n increase of foreign direct investment, with capital
accumulation’s knock-on effects on demand and
supply
n creation of an incentive structure to develop a domes-
tic innovative capacity (assuming that resource alloca-
tion should optimally go towards innovation), leading 
to a wider variety of available products without an 
imitation lag
n creation of an incentive structure for foreign and
domestic firms to direct and increase technological
change toward developing country needs
n increase of technology dissemination via trade and
foreign direct investment, allowing the development of
innovation capacity via learning-to-learn
n elimination of relatively inefficient market structures that
imitate goods embodying intellectual property
n bringing intellectual property disputes into a multilateral
framework, thus avoiding bilateral disputes
n allowing developing countries to force multilateral insti-
tutions (including the WIPO and WTO) to focus on
their particular intellectual property needs.
These varied effects of an intellectual property protection
system can helpfully be looked at in terms of short-run 
(or static) and longer run (or dynamic) effects. The 
static effects are largely negative, while the dynamic effects
have the potential to be positive and to outweigh the 
static effects. 
Some economists and lawyers have
focused strongly on the negative static
supply-side effects of introducing a
strong intellectual property system into
developing countries, as well as the
direct implementation and administra-
tion costs of running patent systems.
They object to the transfer of monopoly
profits from developing countries to
the intellectual property owner both on
grounds of domestic welfare in devel-
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better protected under copyrights, patents, or some sui
generis system has been going on for several years. In the
United States, some software is patentable. Since
copyright protects only the expression of ideas, software is
subject to much closer imitation than is the case under
patents or, presumably, would be under some hybrid
system. Databases are going to be covered by sui generis
systems in the United States and Europe, which may well
prove more effective than copyright protection. Under
TRIPs, no specific protection is required, except to the
extent to which databases are found to fall under copyright
protection.
The third type of emerging technology is that of traditional
knowledge. Unlike the other two, this type of technology is
not new in itself but is fast gaining recognition as a legiti-
mate and protectable form of intellectual property.
Traditional knowledge includes sacred images or art forms,
medical information, and agricultural techniques and
products. Its protection is not easy either under copyright
(who is the author?), or patents (is the invention novel or a
technical advance?). There is concern that traditional
knowledge is being either changed slightly or taken up by
commercial interests for profit, with no reward going to the
creators of this knowledge (or their descendants). This has
led to calls for the creation of a system of protection for it.
Such a system might be based on the idea of communal
rights over particular knowledge, or involve the appoint-
ment of a community representative to be responsible for
its use. Obviously, this is an area of particular interest to
developing countries and their citizens. 
Given that developing countries do not, generally, have a
significant innovative capacity, they clearly have to concern
themselves with the effects of the introduction of systems
to protect intellectual property on their own social welfare.
These effects follow two main avenues, one more immedi-
ate than the other. First, developing countries are users of
innovations, both as consumers of goods embodying them
and as firms imitating innovated goods and processes. The
introduction of intellectual property law
may have an impact on the price and
variety of goods available in a devel-
oped country. Second, they also must
try to determine whether and how
intellectual property protection will
assist in obtaining the longer run
objective of developing an innovative
capacity for themselves.
Here the possible disadvantages for
There is concern that traditional
knowledge is being taken up by
commercial interests for profit.
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oping countries and because of the distributional conse-
quences of such a transfer.
There are two particular reasons to justify this focus on the
immediate, rather than the long-term, effects of this
process.
First, these negative effects will be felt by consumers in
developing countries which can ill afford further economic
inefficiency and loss of national income. Second, the possi-
ble long-term positive effects are not certain. For instance,
even if the increased availability of better quality products is
a potential long-term benefit, without the income to
purchase such products the market for them will not exist.
Existing evidence relating to intellectual property protection
in the context of past trade and foreign direct investment
(FDI) suggests that developing countries usually suffer a
decrease of social welfare.
Theoretical discussion about the dynamic (positive)
economic impact of intellectual property laws on developing
countries has not been extensive. Most of the models
dealing with this question are quite stylised, involving a two-
country world in which one innovates and either exports its
goods or invests in the other country, while the second is a
technology importer (via trade or FDI). However, even these
models capture many of the main issues and quite clear and
intuitive results do come out of them. Ultimately, empirical
evidence will be needed to determine the effects on devel-
oping countries. Some empirical evidence exists, and is
considered below, but conclusive results are lacking. More
research is needed, particularly on the potential dynamic
effects of all intellectual property protection. 
Static models may not capture many of the possible
benefits of intellectual property protection via trade and FDI,
particularly technology spillovers and a possible push
towards a domestic innovative capacity. Dynamic general
equilibrium models serve to point out how intellectual
property protection might indeed be beneficial to develop-
ing countries. If the levels of technol-
ogy spillovers via trade are positively
correlated with the level of intellectual
property protection, then developing
countries may choose stronger intel-
lectual property protection.
There exists another related argument
for developing countries to strengthen
intellectual property protection. While
one effect of weak intellectual property
protection may be to lower the incentive to do R&D in devel-
oped countries, another may be to induce developed
country firms to invest in other ways to prevent imitation of
their innovations. Firms in developed country, therefore, will
have to use resources to protect their innovations and
developing country firms will have to use resources to
imitate. The introduction of some intellectual property
protection can reallocate resources away from these activi-
ties to the welfare improvement of all. However, empirical
evidence, indicating that increased patent protection leads
to increased imitation costs, may not be consistent with this
argument.
Another reason for introducing intellectual property protec-
tion is to provide incentive for developed country firms to
choose innovations that are better suited to developing
countries’ preferences. If developing and developed
country consumers have different preferences for a variety
of goods and no effective intellectual property protection
system is in place, then innovating firms have less incentive
to produce those goods preferred by developing country
consumers. Of course, the relative size and purchasing
power of markets in the two regions is also an obviously
important factor as to whether firms will choose to direct
innovations at developing country markets.
The introduction of technology spillovers via trade and FDI
can influence the social welfare impact of intellectual
property protection. This effect may come from four
sources: the effect on the terms of trade, the effect on the
variety of goods available, the location of goods manufac-
turing, and R&D investment over time. Existing results
indicate that the strengthening of intellectual property rights
will usually be detrimental to developing countries, with or
without FDI, when developing countries are purely imitators
of developed country technologies and the 
direction of technological change and imitation costs are
not subject to change. If a developing country were to
develop an innovative capacity as a result, then the picture
could be reversed. 
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N
ew communications and information technolo-
gies (ICT) are slashing the cost of new commu-
nications networks. This offers, particularly to
developing countries, the prospect of better
provision of education, health care and a host of
other services.
Some writers have gone further. In the words of Frances
Cairncosss 
To allow communications to work their magic, poor
countries will need sound regulations, open markets,
and, above all, widely available education. Where
these are available, countries with good communica-
tions will be indistinguishable. They will all have
access to services of world class quality. They will be
able to join a world club of traders, electronically
linked, and to operate as though geography has no
meaning. The equality of access will be one of the
great prizes of the death of distance.1
Distance
Anthony Venables looks at claims
that IT has changed the rules of
economic geography.
still
matters
1 The death of distance, 2.0: how the communications revolution will
change our lives Harvard Business School Press 2001.
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This view of the effects of ICT is misleading. New technolo-
gies will certainly have an effect on the costs of “distance”,
but it will be mixed and complex. Some activities can be
digitised and supplied from a distance, but most cannot.
Geography determines a firm’s profitability not only via ease
of access to markets, but also via access to a variety of
related activities. 
For example, you find dense local networks of suppliers of
specialised goods and services for industry. Local labour
markets develop with specialist skills. Firms benefit from
being close to research centres and from the knowledge
spillovers that derive from clusters of like activity. Finally, it
is often easier to manage and monitor activity in an estab-
lished location, where firms acquire knowledge and can
benchmark their performance locally.
How does technology change these “clustering” forces?
Some will be weakened by ICT. For example, proximity may
come to matter less for the flow of knowledge between
firms and for the supply of business services. But other
clustering forces – such as those arising from labour market
skills – are likely to be unaffected. Some activities will no
longer need to be close to consumers and will go in search
of lower cost locations, but low costs also depend on
wages, social infrastructures and access to the benefits of
a cluster of related activities. Consequently, some activities
may move to lower wage countries, while others become
more deeply entrenched in high wage economies. 
Previous communications revolutions provide an illustration.
The transport revolutions of the 19th century did not lead to
the dispersion of economic activity, but to its concentration
in relatively few countries and, within those countries, in
large and often highly specialised cities. Lower transport
costs reduced the value of proximity to consumers, but they
were supplied from urban centres where production
exploited the advantages of returns to scale and agglomer-
ation externalities. So, too, with ICT, we may see changes
in the geography of the world economy, but not changes
towards the “integrated equilibrium” view of the death of
distance.
The fact is that geography still matters greatly for many
economic transactions. Trade, investment and knowledge
transfers are overwhelmingly local transactions, which fall
off sharply with distance. The standard framework for
quantifying the effect of distance on economic interactions
is the gravity model, which relates interactions between a
pair of countries to their economic “mass” and to a measure
of the cost of the interaction between them.
Extensive data permits the gravity trade model to be
estimated on the bilateral trade flows of one hundred or
more countries. Studies find that the elasticity of trade flows
with respect to distance is between -0.9 and -1.5. The
decline in trade volumes implied by this relationship is very
steep. Table 1 shows trade volumes at different distances.
Relative to their value at 1,000 km, by 4,000 km volumes
are down by 82% and by 8,000 km down by 93%. Table 1
shows the results when similar methodologies have been
used to study other economic interactions. Portes and Ray
study cross-border equity holdings.2 Their baseline specifi-
cation gave an elasticity of transactions with respect to
distance of -0.85. The table shows the results of other
similar studies into the effect of distance on flows of foreign
direct investment (FDI) and technology.
If distance matters for a whole range of economic interac-
tion, how might it feed into the distribution of income across
countries? A number of mechanisms might be at work,
including the effects of investment and technology flows.
By Anthony Venables 
Table 1 Economic interactions and distance
Flows relative to their magnitude at 1000km
Trade Equity flows FDI Technology
0 = –1.25 0=–0.85 0=–0.42
1000km 1 1 1 1
2000km 0.42 0.55 0.75 0.65
4000km 0.18 0.31 0.56 0.28
8000km 0.07 0.17 0.41 0.05
CentrePiece Spring 2001
2 Portes, R and Rey, H, The Determinants of Cross-Border Equity Flows,
CEPR Discussion Paper No 2225, 1999.
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But, to illustrate effects, let us here take just the way in
which trade flows can generate international income gradi-
ents. Taking data for 101 countries, Steve Redding and I
have shown a strong positive relationship between a
country’s access to foreign markets and per capita income.3
There are outliers, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
the US and Japan. The sheer population mass of the US
and Japan means that domestic market and supplier access
are extremely important relative to foreign access. But, for
the rest of the sample, the relationship holds within regions
as well as between them. Thus, there is a European wage
gradient lying from the core countries down through Spain
and Portugal to Greece. And there is an East European
gradient, lying below the West European, indicating that
these countries have a lower per capita income than their
location alone would explain. 
Of course, we are not claiming that geography is the only
cause of cross-country variations in income. Other research
has suggested that, as might be expected, endowments of
hydrocarbons per capita, the proportion of land lying within
the tropics, former socialist rule, involvement in external
wars and the prevalence of malaria are also powerful deter-
minants. Indeed, together with foreign market access, this
group of factors seems to explain about two thirds of total
cross-country variation in per capita income. However, in
the context of this debate, the point is that distance does
still matter greatly as a determinant of per capita income.
We need to look at the ways in which ICT might impact on
the elements of transaction cost involved in distance. Let us
consider the case of a firm considering from where to
source is supplies, or where to locate its own production.
Distance affects four main elements. First, any sort of trade
involves finding a trading partner, a process of search and
matching. Second, the supply chain or the direct investment
has to be managed. Third, inputs and outputs have to be
transported. Finally, distance involves the costs linked to
time in transit.
Clearly, a major reason why transactions fall off with
distance is that we know less about potential trades with
people far off than about potential trades with our neigh-
bours. Relatively little is known about the magnitude of this
information barrier, but the new technologies – the Internet
in particular – can significantly reduce search and matching
costs. From my desktop, a search engine produces “about
10,300” matches for the search string “garment+
export+china+ltd” and the first 10, at least, are trading
houses or Chinese firms offering supply. 
Most research in this area has been national, rather than
international, in focus. For example, in the US automobile
market in 1999 more than 40% of buyers used the Internet
to find price and model information, though only 3% of
sales were made this way. This example makes the point,
which many domestic dotcom companies have discovered
to their cost and which is even more true in an international
context, that the Internet is excellent for acquiring informa-
tion, but that information is a necessary and not a sufficient
condition for completing a trade. 
Both outsourcing and foreign direct investment, in their
different ways, involve a fragmentation of the structure of a
firm, as production is split geographically or organisation-
ally. This fragmentation potentially offers the benefit of being
able to move particular stages of the production process to
the lowest cost locations. However, it also creates formida-
ble management challenges. Product specification and
other information have to be transferred; production sched-
ules and quality standards have to be monitored. Does ICT
reduce the costs involved?
To the extent that information is “codifiable”, the answer is
likely to be yes. In mass production of standardised
products, design can be relatively easily codified; the
production process is routine; daily, or hourly, production
runs can be reported; and quality data can be monitored.
Dell Computers offers a classic example of the use of new
technologies to outsource, getting components from suppli-
ers at short notice. However, it is instructive that Dell’s
business practices have not been widely emulated. They
make PCs, which are almost entirely assembled from
standard parts, available from many sources, without the
need to order special components in advance. Consumer
CentrePiece Spring 2001
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Inequality, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2568, revised version at
http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/ajv/winc.pdf
Trade, investment 
and knowledge transfer 
are overwhelmingly 
local transactions.
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customisation of PCs is within narrow limits: speed and
memory, but not colour and trim. 
In many other activities the pertinent information cannot be
codified so easily. One reason for this is inherent complex-
ity. For example, frequent design changes and a process of
ongoing product design and improvement require a level of
interaction that – to date – can only be achieved by face-to-
face contact. 
A second reason is that contracts are incomplete, with
people on either side of the contract (or people in different
positions with a single firm) having their own objectives. It is
typically expensive or impossible to ensure that their incen-
tives can be shaped to be compatible with meeting the
objectives of the firm. 
While ICT may reduce the costs of monitoring in this area,
it seems unlikely that these contract problems can be
solved by technological fix. It is true, on the one hand, that
in recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the
outsourcing activities of specialist suppliers, suggesting
that the difficulties in writing contracts and monitoring
performance have been reduced. On the other hand, a
number of empirical studies point to the continuing impor-
tance of face-to-face contact. The evidence on business
travel suggests that, as electronic communications have
increased, so too has business travel. New technologies
allow dispersion of activities that only require “conversa-
tional” transactions, but also increase the complexity of
production and design processes and so increase 
Figure 1 Transportation versus communication costs, 1940-1990
C
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t
Source: Baldwin and Martin (1999)
Year
Ocean freight
Air freight
Satellite charges
Transatlantic phone call
Information is a necessary and not a 
sufficient condition for completing a trade.
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the proportion of activities that require “handshake”
communication. 
There remain the costs of transporting inputs and outputs.
How large are these costs and how might ITC reduce
them? There are wide differences in transport costs across
commodities and across countries. Thus in 1999, for the
US, freight expenditure was only 3.8% of the value of
imports, but the equivalent numbers for Brazil and Paraguay
were 7.3% and 13.3% respectively. These values incorpo-
rate the fact that most trade is with countries that are close
and in goods with relative low transport costs. Taking trans-
port costs unweighted by trade volumes, the numbers are
much higher. Thus the median cif/fob ratio for all country
“pairs” for which data is available is 1.28, implying transport
and insurance costs of 28%. Across commodities, an
unweighted average of freight rates is typically two to three
times higher than the trade weighted average.
How are transport costs changing over time? Figure 1
shows the evolution of the costs of ocean shipping,
airfreight and transmission of digitised information. There
are three main points to notice. First, the cost of sea trans-
port declined during the 1940s and 1950s, but has not
trended down since then, though there have been substan-
tial fluctuations largely because of oil price movements. This
may seem surprising, given the technical progress in
shipping, but this has been no faster that the average in the
rest of the economy. 
Second, the cost of airfreight fell faster and continued to fall
for a longer period, but also bottomed out from the 1980s
onwards. Third, the cost of transmitting digitised informa-
tion has experienced the most dramatic fall and can now be
regarded as being close to zero. In terms of investigating
international inequalities, therefore, the important question
is: what share of world expenditure is now “weightless” and
can be digitised and transmitted at close to zero cost?
There are numerous examples of activities that have been
digitised and relocated, such as airline ticketing services
and the backroom operations of banks, or detailed archi-
tectural “shop drawings”. But, if we look sectorally to try to
get a quantitative estimate of this outsourcing, the numbers
look rather small. Figures are available for US household
consumption of ICT-based products and services. By 1998,
50% of Americans already had a PC and 30% were regular
Internet users. But total consumption of ICT-based
products and services, including voice telephony, was only
2.4% of consumer expenditure. The OECD estimates that
all software and computer-related services accounted for
2.7% of US GDP in 1996 and only half that in the other
OECD countries studied. Software products and computer
services, according to the OECD, together accounted for
just 0.8% of US exports in 1996.
Although it is difficult to quantify the share of the economy
that is, or is likely to become, weightless, one fundamental
point can be made. As activities are codified and digitised,
not only can they then be moved costlessly through space,
but they are typically also subject to very large productivity
increases and price reductions. Thus, the effect of ICT on,
say, airline ticketing, has been primarily to replace labour
with computer equipment and only secondarily to cause the
remaining workers to be employed in India, rather than in
the US or Europe. This suggests that, even if more activities
become weightless, the share of world expenditure and
employment attributable to these activities will remain small
– perhaps as little as a few per cent of world GDP.
With shipping, another major element is the cost of time in
transit. The importance of these costs is highlighted in
recent work4 by D. Hummels analysing data on some 25
million observations of shipments into the US over 25 years,
some by air and some by sea. Given data on the costs of
each mode and shipping times from different countries, he
was able to estimate the implicit value of time saved by
using air transport. The numbers are quite large. 
The cost of an extra day’s travel for imports as a whole was
around 0.3% of the value shipped. For manufacturing
sectors, that went up to 0.5%. These costs are around 30
times the interest charge on the value of the goods. One
implication is that transport costs have fallen much more
through time than is suggested by looking at freight charges
alone. Between 1950 and 1998, the share of US imports
going by air freight rose from zero to 30%, while container-
isation roughly doubled the speed of ocean shipping. This
Table 2 Exports of telecommunications equipment, final and parts
Number of countries classified by per capita income and share of telecoms in exports.
1983-85 1995-97
Telecoms as % country’s exports Low income Mid income High income Low income Mid income High income
<3.33% 36 9 14 32 7 11
3.3% – 6.6% 1 1 3 3 4 5
6.6% – 10% 0 2 1 1 1 2
>10% 0 0 1 1 0 1
Share of countries in all 
telecoms exports 0.051 0.117 0.83 0.191 0.112 0.697
4 See D. Hummels, Time As a Trade Barrier, mimeo Purdue University, 2000.
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determining journey time. If the total time taken by 
production and shipping depends on activities that happen
in parallel, then reducing the time taken in information trans-
mission increases the relative value of saving even more
time by making a marginal reduction in shipping distance.
Again, in this case, the improvement in technology encour-
ages activity to move closer to the centre.
Evidence of such a phenomenon comes from the study of
“just in time” techniques, where new technologies have
allowed much improved stock control and ordering. A
study of the US automobile industry by T.H. Klier, published
in 1999 by the Chicago Federal Reserve5, found that 70 to
80% of suppliers were located within one day’s drive of
assembly plants, even though suppliers were serving
several different assembly plants. He also found evidence
that the concentration of suppliers around assembly plants
had increased since 1980, a finding consistent with the
introduction of just-in-time production methods. 
The leader in such methods has been Toyota, whose
independent suppliers are on average only 59 miles from its
assembly plants to which they make eight deliveries a day.
By contrast, General Motors’ suppliers in North America are
an average of 427 miles away from the plants they serve and
make fewer than two deliveries a day. As a result, Toyota and
its suppliers maintain inventories that are only 25% those of
General Motors (Fortune, 8 December 1997.)
produced a reduction of 26 in the average number of
shipping days, equivalent to a shipping cost reduction
worth 12 to 13% of the value of goods traded.
Given the magnitude of these costs, how might a timesav-
ing technology influence the location of production? Take,
for example, a firm selling a fashion-sensitive product.
Under old retail stock control technology it was impossible
to detect consumer response to this season’s fashions until
after it was too late to change production for this season. All
stock had to be produced in advance and a proportion had
to be discounted. With the new technology, the firm can
learn about fashion changes instantly. However, production
and shipping take time and the season is limited, so the
shorter the time taken getting in the new products to meet
the changed fashion, the lower the proportion of the season
during which the firm has to discount what it sells. Thus a
supply of trained workers and the ability to meet rapid deliv-
ery times would be a reason for having production close at
hand, instead of producing in a low-wage economy. Other
such examples could arise in intermediate goods supply,
where new technology might make it easier to detect faults
and the supplier would then want to move production closer
to cut delivery times, so that fewer faulty items were in the
delivery chain.
Firms may also relocate their production because of the
direct complementarity between technology and distance in
Toyota and its suppliers maintain inventories
that are only 25% those of General Motors.
5 http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/
economicperspectives/1999/ep1Q99_2.pdf
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ICT will, of course, change the costs of distance in quite
different ways for different types of activity. For many,
where it is difficult to codify information or write complete
contracts and where rapid response to changing circum-
stances is important, face-to-face contact and proximity to
markets will remain important. For these activities, there is
yet another reason why their concentration might increase.
It derives from the possibility of spatially separating some
of what they do from the routine parts of their supply
process. For example, suppose that financial services
require both “front room” operations (which tend to
cluster) and “back room” operations (which are intensive in
medium-skilled labour and office space requirements). If
both operations have to be together, then the overall
clustering force might be quite weak: firms that are not in
London, Tokyo or New York lose out on the benefits of
being in a cluster, but have those of cheaper labour and
office space. But, if back room operations can be
separated, then the agglomeration forces on front room
operations become overwhelming. Financial services – in
some ways a prime example of a “weightless” activity – are
in fact enormously concentrated in a few centres, with no
prospect of ICT causing their dissolution.
What, then, will happen to the more routine and codifiable
activities? One possibility is that they will spread more
evenly, bringing modest increases in labour demand to
many countries. An alternative is that relocation takes these
industries to relative few countries. This is what we would
expect to see, if these activities themselves have a propen-
sity to cluster. This propensity may be weak; but, when
such activities leave established centres in search of lower
wage locations, one that already has some similar activities
will look more attractive than one that has none.
As a consequence, some countries will experience a rapid
increase in labour demand and wages, while others remain
essentially untouched by the process. New technologies
change the pattern of inequalities in the world economy,
but do not decrease them uniformly.
This model is broadly in line with what we know about
some recent sectoral relocations. For example, much
software production has left the US, but to concentrate
largely in Ireland and Bangalore. At a broader level, there
has been growth in production networks with components
production outsourced, but again concentrated in a few
lower-wage countries.
The growth in production networks has produced a
substantial increase in trade in components, amounting
now to perhaps 30% of total world trade. However, this
growth of vertical specialisation and its associated trade is
heavily concentrated in a few countries that neighbour
existing centres in Asia, Europe and America.
An example of this growth and concentration is illustrated
in Table 2, which shows exports of telecommunications
equipment. The 68 countries in the sample are divided
according to their initial (1983-85) per capita incomes. The
table gives the number of countries in each income group,
classified according to the share of telecoms in their
exports. It shows that the share of low income countries
rose from 5% to 19% between the early 1980s and the
late 1990s. 
The point to note is the skewness of this distribution.
Telecoms equipment production and trade has become
very important for just a few low income countries (for one
of them it accounts for more than 10% of its total exports,
for another between 6.6 and 10%), but for the majority it
remains unimportant. This pattern is repeated in other
sectors generally, with the same set of countries being the
main exporters.
Speculating about the implications of new technology is a
notoriously risky activity, but it seems clear that they will not
mean the “death of distance”. Their contribution to
economic development will be important, but will come
primarily from allowing individuals greater access to
knowledge, education and basic services – not through
rewriting the rules of economic geography.
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